





Aumann and Hart (Econometrica, Nov. 2003) have shown that in games of one-
sided incomplete information, the set of equilibrium outcomes achievable can be ex-
panded considerably if the players are allowed to communicate without exogenous
timelimitsandcompletelycharacterisetheequilibriafromsuchcommunication. Their
research provokes (atleast) four questions. (i) Isit true that the set ofequilibriumpay-
offs stabilises (i.e. remains unchanged) if there are sufﬁciently many rounds of com-
munication? (ii) Is the set of equilibria from communication which is unbounded but
ﬁnite with probability one is the same as equilibria from communication which is just
unbounded? (iii) Are any of these sets of equilibria “simple” and if so, is there an al-
gorithm to compute them? (iv) Does unbounded communication (of order type ω)
exhaust all possibilities so that further communication is irrelevant? We show that in
the context of ﬁnite Sender-Receiver games, the answer to all four is yes if the game
satisﬁes a certain geometric condition. We then relate this condition to some geomet-
ric facts about the notion of bi-convexity and argue that if any of the questions has a
negative answer then all three of the questions are likely to have a negative answer.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Crawford and Sobel [11], it has been well understood by game
theorists and economists that cheap pre-play communication or cheap talk can expand the
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set of equilibrium outcomes that can be achieved by the players in a game. What is not
well understood is the importance of the structure of the communication phase itself. In a
wonderfulnew paper, Aumann and Hart [3] have shownthat the Crawford-Sobelmodelof
communication which consists of one round of signalling is signiﬁcantly lacking in gener-
ality in that multiple rounds of communication can greatly increase the set of equilibrium
outcomes. They then study unbounded communication in two-player games of one-sided
incomplete information and completely characterise the set of equilibrium outcomes.
Their investigations provoke a number of interesting questions. First, Is it the case that
the set of equilibria from ﬁnite conversations (we shall use conversation to indicate the
kind of communication we have in mind) eventually stabilises if we consider sufﬁciently
long conversations? Second, Is it the case that the equilibria from conversations that are
ﬁnite almost surely are the same as the equilibria from unbounded conversations (which
are considered by Aumann and Hart)? Third, Are these sets of equilibria “simple”?1 And
ﬁnally, Is the case that unbounded conversations (of order type ω) exhaust all possibilities
so that longer questions are unnecessary? We ﬁnd sufﬁcient conditions for all of these
questions to have an afﬁrmative answer.
Atthispointitispertinenttodiscusstheimportanceandrelevanceofthefourquestions
posed above. These questions stem from the nature of the Aumann-Hart communication
phase. Aumann and Hart consider communication of order type ω so that their games
are of order type ω + 1. But while their theory is conceptually simple, it is far from clear
just what the practical implications of their theory are. In particular, one might think that
just as in the case of most repeated games, it may be possible to approximate the equilib-
ria from unbounded communication by considering games with communication that lasts
sufﬁciently long. After all, ﬁnite games are things that are well understood. But as is well
known, this is not the case (and an example of this is provided below).
Another possibility is our more mathematical conception of a game. If the players were
to submit their strategies to a computing machine (a register machine, say), would the ma-
chine be able to tell us the outcome of the play? Unfortunately, we do not know the answer
to this question. Of course, in this paper we do not answer this question but what we do
achieve is provide sufﬁcient conditions for a Sender-Receiver game so that the aforemen-
tioned machine is capable of providing us with the outcome.
To put matters in perspective, recall that the usual assumption in the case of Sender-
Receiver games – games where the Sender has some private information and the Receiver
1We shall call a set simple if the set can be built up from simple geometric structures of increasing dimen-
sionin ﬁnitelymany steps. Moretechnically, inthelanguageofalgebraictopology,asimpleset hasasimplicial
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takes the onlypayoffrelevant action – is that thereis oneroundofsignalling after which the
Receiver takes an action. However, a drawback of such a description of the state of affairs
is precisely that it involves only one round of signalling by the Sender. In principle, there is
no reason to assume a priori that there cannot be any further communication. Indeed, if
opportunities for further communication did present themselves, the agents cannot com-
mit to not using them. Assumptions to the contrary seem strange especially when we are
assuming that the agents cannot make commitments.
We maythereforepositthatthenaturalobjectstoconsiderareconversationsthatdonot
have exogenous deadlines. The reader may feel that talk without a ﬁnite deadline, which
we shall refer to as unbounded talk, is unnatural. We would like to argue that it is talk
with an exogenous deadline that is unnatural. We want to consider a scenario where the
agents cannot commit to anything and are free to do as they please. There are no artiﬁcial
restrictions on how long they can talk. The inﬁnite horizon should be viewed only as the
possibility of the players coming back and having another round of talk. It is but a thought
processthat gives both playersrealstrategic alternatives whichmay not exist in the presence
of deadlines. All that is required is that there be no exogenous deadline. A similar view has
been taken by Rubinstein in [24] about the use of inﬁnitely repeated games, where he says:
“By using inﬁnite horizon games we do not assume that the real world is inﬁ-
nite. ...An inﬁnitely repeated game is meant to assist in analyzing speciﬁc situ-
ations whereplayersexamine along-termsituation withoutassigning a speciﬁc
status to the end of the world.”
Another example where the absence of a deadline makes all the difference is the Rubinstein
bargaining model[23], wheretheplayerscouldbargain foreverbutonlyplay foroneperiod
in the unique equilibrium. Here too, it is the possibility of inﬁnite interactions that leads
(immediately) to the optimal outcome. It should be noted that Sender-Receiver games are
special in that it is after the so-called talking phase that the Receiver takes an action. Thus,
having unbounded talk could mean that the agents talk for inﬁnitely many periods and the
Receiver takes an action after that. Or it could mean that we only consider conversations
that are unbounded but end in ﬁnite time with probability 1. Both possibilities will be
examined in the sequel and we will demonstrate that in Sender-Receiver games such dis-
tinctions are irrelevant if the game satisﬁes a ﬁniteness condition. This ﬁniteness condition
is related to geometric structure of the payoffs of the game and is not known to be violated
by any game.
In this paper we restrict attention to communication in Sender-Receiver games where
the Sender has ﬁnitely many types and the Receiver has ﬁnitely many actions. (Precise1 Introduction 4
deﬁnitions can be found in §3.) In our main result (Theorem A), we show that in Sender-
Receiver games, the set of equilibrium outcomes that can be achieved with unbounded
conversations is the same as the set of equilibrium outcomes that can be achieved with un-
bounded conversations that are ﬁnite with probability 1 when the game satisﬁes the afore-
mentioned ﬁniteness condition. This is a signiﬁcant result for two reasons. The ﬁrst reason
is thatthe possibility ofunboundedconversationusually providesasigniﬁcant enlargement
to the set of achievable outcomes. The second reason is that it tells us that our intuitive rea-
sons forconsideringconversationswithno deadline is withoutloss ofgenerality as we don’t
have to consider conversations that literally last forever to exhaust all the possibilities for
information transmission.
Following Aumann and Hart, there are some other questions that one may ask of cheap
talk equilibria. One of these is whether the set of equilibria from ﬁnite conversations sta-
bilise after some large ﬁnite number of stages. Another question is whether the sets of
equilibria are simple. A third question is whether there can be any more information that
can be transmitted after the players talk for inﬁnitely many periods. It turns out that all of
these questions are closely related and an afﬁrmative answer to the ﬁrst two questions and
a negative answer to the third depends on whether some underlying sets are well behaved.
We go on argue that all of these properties, in a sense, come together, hence representing a
dichotomy of the good and the bad.
We achieve this by exploiting the special geometric structure of the graph of payoffs in
Sender-Receiver games. Aumann and Hart characterise equilibria of games with extended
talk (which they call long cheap talk) in terms of stochastic processes called di-martingales,
that converge to limit distributions that lie (almost surely) in the graph of payoffs of the
incomplete informationgame and show in [2] that the associated bi-convex set can be char-
acterised in terms of separation by bi-convex functions. They also note that in general, the
process of separation may be transﬁnite. In Sender-Receiver games, this graph essentially
depends on only ﬁnitely many points – a fact which has signiﬁcant consequences.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In §2, we describe the relative po-
sition of our results with respect to the extant literature. In §3, we give a formal description
of the model. In §4, we discuss the mechanics of information transmission in cheap talk
games. In §4.1, we give a qualitative description of the workings of conversationsand argue
that one can restrict attention to the so-called canonical conversations. In §4.2, we describe
the mathematical underpinnings of the Aumann-Hart theory which we shall use exten-
sively in the sequel and also describe brieﬂy the intuition behind the Aumann-Hart results.
In §4.3, we discuss some of the more delicate game-theoretic aspects relating to the deﬁni-
tions of strategy and equilibrium concept used. We then prove our result on unbounded
conversations in Sender-Receiver games (Theorem A) in §5. In §6, we consider both ﬁnite2 Related Literature 5
conversations and transﬁnite conversations and discuss the nature of our sufﬁcient condi-
tion. §7 concludesand Appendix A provides a complete and self-contained (and therefore,
a necessarily concise) description of the mathematical concepts introduced in [2], missing
proofs and an axiomatisation of the graph of the payoff correspondenceof the silent game.
2 Related Literature
The theory of strategic information transmission when there are no signalling costs can
be traced back to Crawford and Sobel [11], who consider a Sender-Receiver game with
one round of communication where the preferences of the Sender and Receiver are not
completely aligned. They show that as the preferences diverge, the amount of information
transmitted decreases and for full revelation, their preferences must be perfectly aligned.
There is also the literature on approaches to contracting with imperfect commitment (of
which our games would be an extreme example). Here, Bester and Strausz [6] provide a
characterisation of the set of incentive efﬁcient equilibria when there is one round of com-
munication. They convertthe problemto a programming problem,albeit under the condi-
tion of incentive efﬁciency, which is stronger than the condition of incentive compatibility.
They also deal with all intermediate cases of partial commitment and show that there is
an equilibrium where all types signal truthfully with positive probability. The papers men-
tioned above represent one part of the literature on cheap talk, which is concernedwith the
expansion of the set of equilibria through talk. There is another part which is interested in
reﬁning the set of equilibria, for example Blume and Sobel [7] who consider the effects of
introducing further communication possibilities on the set of equilibria and are interested
in equilibria that are immune to such possibilities.
The study of extended conversations arose out of considerations stemming from the
study of (undiscounted)repeated games ofone-sided incomplete information. In that con-
text,acompletecharacterisationisprovidedbyHart[15]usingtheconceptsofbi-convexity
and bi-martingales which are formally introduced by Aumann and Hart [2]. Cheap talk is
conceptually simpler than repeated games because we do not have to keep track of inﬁnite
streams of payoffs, only of the probabilities. Another advantage in the case of cheap talk is
that the issue of existence of Nash equilibria is settled trivially which is not the case in the
case of repeated games (see [26]).
Extendedconversationsare describedformallyby Aumann and Hart in[3]whoprovide
a completecharacterisation ofthe set ofequilibrium payoffs fromunboundedcoversations.
An example that shows that extended talk can increase the set of equilibrium outcomes is
duetoForges[13]whoshowsthat unboundedconversationsthatare ﬁnite withprobability
1 provide outcomes not achievable with ﬁnite conversations. Needless to say, her analysis3 Model 6
uses the concepts of bi-convexity and bi-martingales. She also provides a host of examples
in[14]. AnotherexampleduetoSimon[25],whichweshallstudyindetailinthesequel,has
the property that ﬁnite conversations of any length do not yield any equilibria other than
the babbling equilibrium (which we shall call the equilibrium of the silent game), whereas
inﬁnite talk allows for Pareto improvements for all types of the Sender and the Receiver.
The benchmark for communication in games of incomplete information is the use of
thedisinterested mediatorwhichentails theplayerssending theirprivateinformationtothe
mediator and the mediator making incentive compatible probabilistic recommendationsof
actions to the players. This represents a mediated solution and any outcome that can be
achieved by any communication mechanism can be realised as a mediated solution. For a
thorough discussion of the so-called Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms, the reader
is referred to Chapter 6 of [21].
There is another literature which studies the expansion of the set of equilibria through
unmediated communication mechanisms, but uses protocolsin a manner akin to the com-
puter science literature. Most notable among these is the paper Ben-Porath [5] who shows
that in three person games of incomplete information, there exists a communication pro-
tocol which enables the players to implement any mediated solution. (By Theorems A and
B of Aumann and Hart [3], there can be no such protocolin the case of two player games of
incompleteinformation.) Anothercloselyrelatedpaperis duetoUrbano and Vila[28]who
show that when players have bounded computational abilities, any correlated equilibrium
in a two-person normal form game of complete information can be implemented via an
appropriate protocol. They use a variant of the idea of public key encryption and rely on
the fact that certain algebraic operations such as exponentiation and taking logarithms in
prime ﬁelds are very complicated and very hard to compute.
3 Model
A Sender-Receiver game Γ can be characterised by Γ := (TS,CR,p,uS,uR), where TS is a
ﬁnite set of types of the Sender with |TS| = k,2 CR is the set of actions of the Receiver
(which is assumed to be ﬁnite), p ∈ ∆k−1 is a probability vector representing the Receiver’s
prior beliefs about the Sender’s type (where ∆k−1 := {p ∈ Rk :
 k
i=1 pi = 1} is the
(k−1)-dimensional simplex) withp ≫ 0 and uS : CR×TS → R and uR : CR×TS → R are
utility functions3 for the Sender and Receiver respectively. In other words, the only payoff
2For any set A, we denote its cardinality by |A|.
3The utility functions uS and uR are extended to mixed strategies by linearity. For notational simplicity,
we shall deﬁne utility functions only over pure strategies in the sequel, with the understanding that they can
be extended to mixed strategies in the obvious way.4 The Mechanics of Cheap Talk 7
relevant action is taken by the Receiver.
We will now consider the extended Sender-Receiver game–the game with communica-
tion. (Since the point of a Sender-Receiver game is to model communication, we shall refer
to a Sender-Receiver game with communication as a Sender-Receiver game in the sequel.)
The sequence of events is as follows. First, Nature picks the Sender’s type at random. As
in [3], we shall call this the information phase. This is followed by a communication phase.
The communication phase consists of players sending verbal messages to each other from
a ﬁnite message set M (where |M| > 1). Here, we shall take verbal to mean that there is
no notion of veriﬁability (i.e. it is not possible to determine which type of a player sent
a particular message) while refraining from giving a formal deﬁnition. The length of the
communication phase is denotedby Lc, a randomvariable that maps into the class of ordi-
nals.4 (Note that although Lc can be any ordinal number (up to 2ω), we will primarily be
interested in the cases where Lc is either less than ω (i.e. ﬁnite) a.s. or is a constant taking
thevalueω, thelattercase beingtheoneconsideredinAumannand Hart [3].) Finally, there
is an action phase, where the Receiver takes an action. At the end of of the communication
phase, the Receiver has some posterior beliefs (possibly different fromthe priors) about the
Sender’s type. Given these beliefs, he takes an action. Let β : CR → R be his expected
payoffs at the end of the communication phase from each action taken. In what follows, we
shall also denote the vector of payoffs that the Sender gets by a : CR → Rk. We assume that
there is perfect recall and that the model of communication is commonly known between
the players.
4 TheMechanics ofCheap Talk
In this paper, we consider plain talk, also called cheap talk because it is costless, unmedi-
ated, non-veriﬁable and non-binding. In this section we shall describe the so-called canon-
ical conversations and the underlying mathematical notions following Aumann and Hart in
[3]. In §4.1 we shall informally describe the mechanics of cheap talk and in §4.2 we shall
introduce the mathematics that describes cheap talk. In §4.3 we discuss the game theoretic
aspects of long cheap talk.
4There are some complications that arise if we actually let Lc take any value in the class of ordinals.
Instead, we can assume that Lc takes values in the set of ordinals less than, say, 2ω, where ω is the ﬁrst inﬁnite
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4.1 A Qualitative Discussion
We shall assume here that each player has a ﬁnite message set, M := {a,b,c,...}. Cheap
talk consists of two components. The ﬁrst involves signalling by the Sender, where the only
message sent is by the Sender and the second, called compromising, involves simultaneous
messages sent by both players. As there is no substantive information to be conveyedby the
Receiver, we can ignore stages where messages are sent by the Receiver alone. In commu-
nication games there always exists a babbling equilibrium, an equilibrium where there is no
substantive communication. More precisely, the Sender’s message does not depend on his
type and the Receiver’saction dependsonly onhis priors. Following Aumann and Hart [3],
we too shall refer to these as the equilibria of the silent game. (Thus, an equilibrium always
exists, regardless of the length of the game.) Note that the silent game in [3] is actually a
game, as both players (potentially) have an action to take, whereas our silent game is just
the decision problem of the Receiver given his beliefs.
With only one round of communication, there are two possibilities for cheap talk5, one
where both the players speak and another where only the Sender speaks. The latter is just
signalling, with the only message being sent by the Sender. As mentioned above, there is
always the babbling message where the priorsonthe Sender’stype remains unchanged after
the message. Now suppose that there exist messages that convey some information, i.e. the
posteriors based on the message are different from the priors. In this case, any probability
that is a convex combination of the original prior and the posteriors mentioned above can
be achieved by appropriatelyadjusting the probabilities with which the different types send
messages. Thus, signalling serves the purpose of convexifying across probabilities. Let us








0,0 2,2 t2 [1
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Figure 1: Illustrating signalling
5Indeed, in what follows, all communication will be assumed to be costless. We shall therefore refer to the
signalling and compromising stages of the communication process to differentiate between the two possible
forms of communication – both of which are cheap.4.1 A Qualitative Discussion 9
Consider the game where the Sender has two types, t1 and t2, each occurring with proba-
bility 1
2. The Receiver has two actions c1 and c2. If there is only one round of signalling, it is
easy to see that the Sender will always pretend to be the type t2. Let us describe the strate-
gies more precisely. Suppose the possible messages are M := {x,y} with generic message
being denoted by m. A strategy for the Sender can be described as follows: if type ti, send
x with probability pi. Then, contingent on the message, the posterior probabilities that the
Receiver will have are qm := prob(Sender is type t1|m) where m ∈ M. The payoffs the (two
types of the) Sender can expect from the message m is am. In our game, let us suppose that
p2 = 0. Then, it follows that p1 = 0. The reason is that if p1 were positive, then a1
x < a1
y
(because the Receiver now plays c1 with positive probability which is not good for t1), thus
it is not optimal for type 1 to send x with positive probability. z
More generally, if each type of the Sender sends both messages with probability, it must









y implies pj ∈ [0,1]. (1)










y implies pj = 1. (3)




y, we see the ﬁrst instance of the so-called martingale property,
i.e. regardless of the message sent by type j, the expected payoff remains the same. The
martingale property is essential to the analysis and in longer conversations, there will be




y. Here, we shall assign the type whose posterior payoff is 0, a
virtual payoff which is high enough so that the payoff from each signal is the same whereby
the martingale propertyis restored. (See §4.2 for a more geometric description and [3] for
a thoroughdiscussion ofthe issues involved.) Notealso that the martingale propertycan be
viewed as convexiﬁcation in probabilities because if two posteriorscan be reached fromthe
twomessages for a given prior, thenany convexcombinationof those posteriorscan also be
taken as the prior probability. In other words, using these messages, we can ﬁnd signalling
probabilities for the two types if the Receiver has different priors as long as the priors are
convex combinations of the posterior probabilities.
Aumann and Hart show that the use of simultaneous messages can also be extremely
useful. These do not conveyinformation, but are seen as a compromisebetween the Sender
and the Receiver about future courses of action. A simple example of a game from Blume





0,1 1,2 t2 [1
2]
Figure 2: Illustrating a Compromise
4.2 Example. Compromising.
Consider the game where the Sender has two types, t1 and t2, each occurring withprobabil-
ity
1
2. The Receiver has two actions c1 and c2.
There are two signalling equilibria in this game. There is the babbling equilibrium
where the Receiver takes the action c1 with his expected payoff given by β(c1) = 11
2 and
the Sender’s payoffs are a(c1) = (1,0) (representing the payoffs of each type). There is also
a fully revealing (separating) equilibrium where each type reveals the truth. Here, strategies
are such that the Sender of type t1 sends message x and the Sender of type t2 send message
y. Conditional on x, the Receiver plays c1 and upon receipt of y, the Receiver plays c2. This
equilibrium gives payoffs (1,1) to the two types of the Sender and 2 to the Receiver. Note
that type t1 of the Sender is indifferent between revealing the truth and just babbling, but
the Receiver is not. Now consider players sending each other messages simultaneously be-
forethesignalling period. Letusconsiderjusttwomessages, {a,b}. Eachplayerrandomises
uniformly over the two messages. If the messages sent are {a,a} or {b,b}, then the Sender
will revealhis type. If the outcomeis {a,b} or {b,a}, the Sender will babble. Thus, we have
an equilibrium with expected payoffs (1, 1
2) to the two types of the Sender and 13
4 to the
Receiver.
Such a construction is called a joint lottery and is used to model the outcome of a com-
promise, which is supposed to be random. The important feature here is that no player
can unilaterally alter the probability distribution over the set of outcomes, hence the term
joint lottery. The joint lottery helps us convexify between payoffs, without affecting the Re-
ceiver’s beliefs about the Sender. The convexiﬁcation helps the players achieve a payoff that
was otherwise not achievable. z
Thus, simultaneous messages or joint lotteries serve the purpose of convexifying across
payoffs. Now consider a conversation of some, possibly unbounded length. It is clear that
the conversation can only involve either the Sender sending a message (signalling) or the
two players sending simultaneous messages (joint lotteries). We can convert this into a
conversation where, say, the odd periods involve signalling and the even periods involve
6Equations (1)–(3) represent the so-called incentive compatibility conditions in Forges [13].4.2 The Mathematics of Cheap Talk 11
joint lotteries. This is called a canonical conversation in [3], where it is shown that a payoff
from a conversation is an equilibrium if and only if it is the payoff to a canonical conver-
sation. Of course, this is not trivial and demonstrating it takes some work. For a fuller
discussion with all the relevant details, the reader is referred to [3]. Note also that if the
original conversation is ﬁnite, then the associated canonical conversation is also ﬁnite and
has at most twice the length. Clearly, if the original conversation has inﬁnite length, then
the associated canonical conversation is also inﬁnite but has the same cardinality, ω.
4.2 TheMathematicsofCheap Talk
To get a better understanding of the mathematics underlying the theory of equilibria of
cheap talk games, we ﬁrst consider martingales that have limits in a particular set. For
concreteness, let A ⊂ Rn for some n. Consider the set of all expectations of bounded
martingales whose limits are almost surely in A. This is nothing but co(A), the convex hull
of A. This is because we can think of a martingale as the splitting of a particle where the
center of mass is ﬁxed and therefore the limit distribution is nothing but the limit cloud
that forms. At each point in time, the starting point lies in the convex hull of the limit
cloud. Thus, the starting points of the splitting process is the convex hull of A. We shall
now describe how this idea relates to cheap talk equilibria.
Due to the Aumann-Hart theorem (Theorem A in [3]) that any cheap talk equilibrium
can be viewed as a canonical equilibrium, it sufﬁces to restrict attention to these equilibria.
LetusnowconsiderstochasticprocessesinA×B×Q, whereAisak-dimensional7 compact,
convex subset of Euclidean space representing the payoffs that the Sender can have, B is a
non-degenerate interval in which the Receiver gets payoffs and Q = ∆k−1 representsthe set
of all probabilities over the Sender’s type and let Z := A×B×Q.8 Recall that a martingale
is a sequence of Z-valued randomvariables (zt)∞
0 and Borel ﬁelds (Ft)∞
0 such that for each
t = 0,1,2,...,
1. Ft ⊂ Ft+1 and zt ∈ Ft;
2. E(|zt|) < ∞;
3. zt = E(zt+1|Ft), a.s.
(Here, we follow the notation in [3] and represent random variables in bold type.) A di-
martingale is a Z-valued martingale zt = (at,βt,qt) such that at+1 = at when t is even,
7k-dimensional because there are k types of the Sender.
8To avoid complications in the sequel, we will actually take A and B to be a little bigger than the payoffs
that the players get. For example, if all the payoffs to the Sender and Receiver in the game are in [−1,1]k and
[−1,1] respectively , we may take A × B to be [−2,2]k × [−2,2].4.2 The Mathematics of Cheap Talk 12
qt+1 = qt when t is odd and (a0,β0,q0) is a constant9 (i.e. is deterministic) with all the
equalities holding almost surely.
From the deﬁnition above, it is seen that the q and a coordinates split alternately. This
corresponds to signalling and compromising via joint lotteries. As mentioned above, since
signalling and joint lotteriesperformthe mathematical task of convexifying across different
sections and convexifying can be thought of as a splitting process,it makes sense to think of
canonical equilibria in terms of di-martingales. (That the martingale propertyholds in the
compromise stage of the communication is clear. As was argued in §4.1 in the discussion
of the incentive compatibility conditions (equations (1)–(3)), the martingale property also
holds in the signalling stages.) Now consider the Receiver’s action at the end of the com-
munication stage, regardless of its length. At the end of all the communication he might
have new beliefs about the Sender’s type and takes a corresponding optimal action. This
determines his expected payoff and the Receiver’s payoff. If we think of all possible poste-
rior beliefs, this is the graph of the silent game (i.e. the game without any communication,
where the Receiver takes an action based solely on his priors). Let us make this precise.
For each p ∈ ∆k−1, consider the Sender-Receiver game Γ with priors p, represented by
Γ(p). A mixed strategy of the Receiver is a mixed action10 y ∈ ∆(CR). A (mixed) strategy y








We now let E(p) be the set of equilibrium payoffs in Γ(p) which is easily seen to be non-
empty for each p. Thus, for each p, E(p) consists of pairs (a,β) where for each p, there is
only one β but multiple values of a. Denote by grE, the graph of the payoff correspondence
E(p).
Inordertoensurethatthecanonicalconversationscanberepresentedbydi-martingales,
we may have to add a few more elements to the equilibrium payoff correspondence of the
silent game, E(p) (cf. the discussion following equations (1)–(3)). These are precisely the
virtual payoffs assigned to types which occur with probability 0. With the additional el-
ements, we get E +(p), the modiﬁed equilibrium payoffs correspondence. (The reasons for
adding these additional points are discussed in greater detail in §4.3 below.) Once again, we
will deﬁne E +(p) formally. For each p ∈ ∆k−1, deﬁne E +(p) as the set of all (a,β) ∈ A × B
9This makes z0 the expectation of the di-martingale.




f∈F xf = 1}, the
standard (|F| − 1)-dimensional simplex.4.2 The Mathematics of Cheap Talk 13








at > uS(y,t), ∀ t ∈ TS; and
at = uS(y,t) if pt > 0, for all t ∈ TS.
The graph of the modiﬁed equilibrium correspondenceis
grE
+ := {(a,β,p) ∈ A × B × ∆
k−1 : (a,β) ∈ E
+(p)}.
This is the last element that we need to complete the picture. We now consider the expecta-
tions of all di-martingales whose limits are almost surelyin grE +, a section (corresponding
to the original priors) of which gives us the cheap talk equilibria.
We needafewmoredeﬁnitionstoexploittheabove ideasfully. Weﬁrstrecallthenotion
of stopping time of a martingale. Let (Ω,F,P) be a non-atomic probability space and let
N := {0,1,2,...} be the set of natural numbers. Also, let (zn)n∈N be a sequence of random
variables (taking values in a Euclidean space) and let (Fn)n∈N be a sequence of ﬁnite ﬁelds
such that such that (zn) is a martingale11with respect to (Fn).12 Let N∞ := N ∪ {∞} and
adjoin F∞ :=
 
n∈N Fn (the minimal ﬁeld containing Fn for each n ∈ N) to (Fn). A
random variable α is a stopping time if for every n ∈ N∞, {α = n} ∈ Fn. A stopping
time is a.s. ﬁnite if P(α < ∞) = 1. It is a.s. bounded if there exists n0 < ∞ such that
P(α 6 n0) = 1.
We will be interested in martingales that have almost surely ﬁnite stopping times. It
should be noted that while a stopping time that is a.s. bounded is a.s. ﬁnite, the converse
is not necessarily true. Our assumption that the ﬁelds are ﬁnite also ensure that a stopping
time that is a.s. bounded is also everywhere bounded which implies (by K¨ onig’s lemma13)
that it is everywhere ﬁnite (see §4 of [2]). Another point to note is that the assumption
of a non-atomic probability space is made to allow the representation of a tree for each
martingale in question.
Let G ⊂ Z, where Z is deﬁned as above. Then the di-convex hull of G is the set of
expectations of all ﬁnite di-martingales whose limits are almost surely in G. G# is the set of
expectations of all di-martingales that stop in ﬁnite time almost surely and whose limits are
almost surely in G. Finally, G∗ is the set of all di-martingales whose limits are almost surely
11Standard deﬁnitions of martingale require neither a non-atomic probability space, nor ﬁnite ﬁelds and
the deﬁnitions of martingale and stopping times are valid without them.
12These ideas are described lucidly in §9.3 of [10], for example.
13K¨ onig’s Lemma. Every ﬁnitely generated tree with inﬁnitely many points must contain at least one inﬁnite
branch. (For a proof, see [27].)4.3 Game Theoretic Aspects of Cheap Talk 14
in G. The set G∗ is also called the di-span of G. We are interested in di-martingales whose
limits are almost surely in grE + as these are the only ones with the “correct”payoffs for the
twoplayersbecause grE + representsthe payoff theplayerscanget in theaction phase ofthe
game. Now let G := grE +. This leads to the following results.
1. The q0-section of the di-convex hull of G represents the set of all payoffs from ﬁnite
(i.e. almost surely bounded) conversations.
2. The q0-section of G# represents the payoffs attainable with conversations that are
almost surely ﬁnite.
3. Theq0-sectionofG∗ representsthepayoffsattainable withunboundedconversations.
These results make intuitive sense and follow immediately from Theorem B in [3] and the
characterisation of bi-martingales14 in [2]. Nevertheless, they require proof and this is the
substantial achievement recordedin [2] and [3].
4.3 Game TheoreticAspectsofCheap Talk
We shall now discuss the issue of strategy and solution concept. But before that, let us ﬁrst
revisit our reasons for modifying the payoff correspondence,E(p).15
Consider the equilibrium payoff correspondence of the silent game, grE. By allowing
the types of the Sender with zero probability (i.e. on the boundary of ∆k−1) to get more,
we get the modiﬁed equilibrium payoff correspondence, grE +. In a signalling stage, the
Receiver “promises” different payoffs to different types (cf. equations (1)–(3) above). It
follows from Theorem B in [3], that we can restrict attention to the case where all com-
munication is done with only two messages, so that M = {a,b}. Here, two cases arise.
Consider ﬁrst the case where type j of the Sender is at a signalling node v where the Sender
oftypej sendseachmessage withpositive probability. Let w and w′ be thenodesthatarethe
descendants of v (i.e. have v as their common predecessor). Then it must be that the payoff
to type j of the Sender is such that aj|w = aj|w′; for if aj|w > aj|w′ (say), then the Sender of
type j wouldpickthe nodew withprobability 1. This means that aj|w = aj|w′ = aj|v because
v is the average of the payoffs at w and w′ (as in equation (1)). Thus, if each type j of the
Sender sends both messages a and b with positive probability, we get a martingale.
However, if a particular type is to be assigned probability zero after the signalling (i.e.
picks one of the messages for sure), how much should the Receiver promise him? (Recall
14A bi-martingale is a di-martingale without the β-coordinate.
15Our discussion here is perfunctory at best. For a fuller treatment of the issues involved, the reader is
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that this is the situation considered in equations (2) and (3).) In other words, what should
the continuation payoff be at a node that occurs with probability 0? Indeed, it is in this
case that the martingale property may not hold. In other words, it may be the case that
aj|v = aj|w > aj|w′ where under the strategy in question, node w′ occurs with probability 0.
At the node w′ the Receiver cannot detect a deviation, so (a,β,p) is not a di-martingale. To
resolve this issue, Aumann and Hart proposeraising the payoff at w′ so that the expectation
of the processaj is still a martingale. It goes without saying that these modiﬁcations have to
be made on the entire martingale. For further conceptual and technical details, the reader
is once again referredto [3]. We should mention this method was ﬁrst used by Hart in [15].
Of course, the zero probability situations may arise in other ways too. For this, the reader is
referred, once again, to [3].
The other issue that we have ignored is a description of strategies and the solution con-
cept used. In our informal description, we have described behavioural strategies for the
players. But a strategy is supposedto tell uswhat each playerwill doat each node and all we
permit at the start of play is a mixture over these strategies. But these are not easily deﬁned
in inﬁnite games, as we cannot have independent randomisations at all the nodes where
we have described behavioural strategies (as there are uncountably many of these). Never-
theless, Aumann [1] has shown that we can still deﬁne strategies consistently and allow for
mixtures in a manner analogous to the ﬁnite case. Such a procedure has been used in [3]
and we shall not repeat it here.
The solution concept that we use is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Nevertheless, following
Aumann and Hart [3] we put some restrictions on the off the equilibrium behaviour. The
main issue here is that the Receiver cannot tell when the Sender deviates. If the Sender does
deviate, how do we deﬁne payoffs at nodes in the game tree that were not supposed to be
reached? Butrecallthat ateachnode,thegoalistodeﬁneforeachplayer,anexpectedpayoff
from going through that node. The expedient method is therefore to deﬁne the payoff of
type j ofthe Senderat nodev tobe the expectedpayoff at v if fromthenon, the Senderplays
a best response to the Receiver’s strategy.
5 LongConversations
In this section we shall prove the ﬁrst of our main results, Theorem A, where we show that
the set of equilibria in cheap talk games with unbounded conversations is the same as the
equilibria where the conversationsare unbounded but end in ﬁnite time with probability 1.
For this we shall need a little geometric machinery. As before, this machinery comes from
[2].5 Long Conversations 16
Let A and Q be compact, convex subsets of Euclidean spaces (of possibly different dimen-
sions). Let (Ω,F,P) be a non-atomic probability space. A sequence (zt)∞
0 := (at,qt)∞
0 of
A × Q-valued random variables is a bi-martingale if:
1. There exists a non-decreasing sequence (Ft)∞
0 of subﬁelds of F, such that (zt) is a
martingale with respect to (Ft).
2. For each t = 0,1,..., either at = at+1 or qt = qt+1 (a.s.).
3. z0 is constant (a.s.).
Thus, a bi-martingale is nothing but a di-martingale with the β coordinate missing and we
shall restrict our attention to the set of expectations of bi-martingales with limits almost
surely in the graph of the Sender’s payoffs in the silent game. We can do this for the fol-
lowing reason: Consider an A × B × Q valued di-martingale (zt) with z∞ ∈ A × B × Q
a.s., where A × B × Q is a measurable subset of A × B × Q. This now deﬁnes an A × Q
valued bi-martingale, (yt) with yt ∈ A × Q a.s. This bi-martingale stops if and only if the
associated di-martingale stops. The if part is clear. To see the only if part, note that if the
bi-martingale stops, then the β coordinate cannot move on its own in either the odd or
even periods. Thus, the di-martingale must stop too. We shall be interested in the sets of
expectations of bi-martingales that converge to certain sets and shall make extensive use of
the following notions.
5.1Deﬁnition. A set A ⊂ A×Qis bi-convexif foreach a ∈ A and each q ∈ Q, therespective
a- and q-sections Aa := {q ∈ Q : (a,q) ∈ A × Q} and Aq := {a ∈ A : (a,q) ∈ A × Q}
are convex.
It is easy to see that every convex set is bi-convex, but a bi-convex need not be convex. The
following example illustrates this idea.









2,q) : q ∈ [0,1]
 
. As is easily seen from ﬁgure 3 below, A is bi-convex but not convex.
As with the case of di-martingales, the following deﬁnitions are immediate. Let A be a
measurable subset of A × Q.
5.3 Deﬁnition. bi-co(A) is the smallest bi-convex set containing A.
5.4 Deﬁnition. A# := {z ∈ A × Q : ∃ bi-martingale (zt) with an a.s. ﬁnite stopping time
N such that zN ∈ A (a.s.) and z0 = z (a.s.)}.
5.5Deﬁnition. A∗ := {z ∈ A×Q : ∃ bi-martingale (zt) converging to z∞ such thatz∞ ∈ A
(a.s.) and z0 = z (a.s.)}.5 Long Conversations 17
Figure 3: A bi-convex set that is not convex.
The splitting processanalogy is equally useful in the bi-convexcase. This showsthat A#
and A∗ are bi-convex sets. The reason for looking at bi-martingales rather than the original
di-martingales isthatthesehaveaslightlysimplergeometricstructureandthereisnolossof
generality in doing so. From the game theoretic point of view, once the bi-martingale hits
projA×Q E +(q) (which is what A is supposed to represent), there is no more information
to be transmitted. Once we know the posterior beliefs of the Receiver, we can compute
his optimal action and his unique expected payoff resulting from an optimal action. This
enables us to trace back and talk about the original di-martingale. The major difference
between convexity and bi-convexity is that in the bi-convex case, bi-co(A) ⊂ A# ⊂ A∗ with
the inclusions being strict in general. In the convex case, the three are the same, namely the
convexhull of A, a resultwhich followsimmediately fromCarath´ eodory’sTheorem(cf. §17
in [22]). The following example from [2] illustrates this.
5.6 Example. Let A := {a1 = (2/3,0),a2 = (0,1/3),a3 = (1/3,1),a4 = (1,2/3)} and
A = Q = [0,1]. Then, bi-co(A) = A, but A# = A∗ = bi-co(
 4
i=1{ai,wi}) is much bigger,
as illustrated in ﬁgure 4 below. For a demonstration of the fact that bi-co(A)   A# = A∗,








r w3 r w4
rw1
Figure 4: Example where A = bi-co(A)   A∗
We shall look at a special class of sets and the bi-convex sets that they generate. These are
what we call ﬁnitely generated sets and are deﬁned below.5 Long Conversations 18
5.7 Deﬁnition. A bi-convex combination is a convex combination (a,q) =
 
i αi(ai,qi)
(with αi > 0 and
 
i αi = 1) where either a1 =     = an = a or q1 =     = qn = q.
5.8 Deﬁnition. A set A ⊂ A × Q is generated by A0 ⊂ A if for all a ∈ A, there exist
α1,...,αn (with αi > 0 and
 
i αi = 1) and a1,...,an ∈ A0 such that a =
 n
1 αiai is a
bi-convex combination.
5.9 Deﬁnition. A set A is ﬁnitely generated if there exists a ﬁnite set A0 which generates it.
The reason for looking at ﬁnitely generated bi-convex sets is that in Sender Receiver games,
the (modiﬁed) graph of Sender’s payoffs, projA×Q E +(q) is ﬁnitely generated. This is made
precise in Lemma 5.11. Before proving the lemma, let us see an illustration of this for a
game with two types.
5.10 Example. Consider the following game (ﬁgure 5) due to Simon [25]. The Sender has







α b c d e f g
t1 [q]
3,−354 1,−3 0,−3
2 1,0 4, 1
2 1,1 1,10 t2 [1 − q]
Figure 5: Example 5.10
The graph of the Receiver’s payoffs are depicted in ﬁgure 6. For illustrative clarity, the
Receiver’spayoffs fromany action are not drawn for all possible values of the Sender’s type.
Nevertheless,the Receiver’spayoffs froman action can be extendedtothe entire probability
space as they are linear in the probabilities of the types of the Sender.
Of greater interest, however, is the graph of the Sender’s payoffs, for this set is ﬁnitely
generated in the sense deﬁned above. This is depicted in ﬁgure 7. We shall demonstrate
below that this is not a coincidence, but is a general propertyof Sender-Receiver games.
Consider action f. It is optimal when for the Receiver when he believes the Sender to
be of type 1 with probability q ∈ [ 1
40, 1
4], (as is seen in ﬁgure 6). In ﬁgure 7, this means
that the two types of the Sender get the vector of payoffs given by a(f) whenever the Sender
is of type 1 with probability q ∈ [ 1
40, 1
4] (which means that f is the optimal action for the
Receier). But when q =
1
40, for example, action g is also optimal for the Receiver. Hence the




Let G := projA×Q grE +, that is G is the graph of the Sender’s modiﬁed payoffs from a



























Figure 6: Receiver’s payoffs given by upper envelope
5.11 Lemma. G is ﬁnitely generated.
Proof. Let the Receiver’s actions be c1,c2,...,cn and βi the expected payoff from action ci.
(Note that for each i, βi : ∆k−1 → B is a linear function and that the Receiver’s pay-
offs are given by the upper envelope of these n linear functions, i.e. the graph of β(q) :=
maxi{βi(q)}.) Let Fi := {q ∈ ∆k−1 : βi(q) > βj(q) for j  = i} which gives us the region
of the probability space where the Receiver’s best action is ci. More generally, we can deﬁne
Fi1,...,im := {q ∈ ∆k−1 : βi1(q) =     = βim(q) > βj(q) for j / ∈ {i1,i2,...,im}} which gives
usthe regionofthe probabilityspacewherethe Receiver’sbest actions areci1,ci2,...,cim and
the Receiver is indifferent between these actions. Note that we do not require Fi1,...,im to be
non-empty.
Finite Partition of Probability Space. The F’s deﬁned above partition the probability
space ∆k−1 into ﬁnitely many regions where the Receiver has a set of best actions. Now,
Fi1,...,im is deﬁned as the intersection of ﬁnitely many (bounded) afﬁne sets and is therefore
ﬁnitely generated (i.e. there exists a ﬁnite set so that each point in Fi1,...,im can be written as
a convex combination of these points). (This is a corollary of Theorem 19.1 in [22].)
Lifting to Sender’s Payoffs. We shall now show that the Sender’s payoffs are ﬁnitely gen-
erated. Consider the region of the probability space given by the set Fi1,...,im. The Receiver is
indifferent betweenactions ci1,...,cim in this region. Thus, the (vectorsof)Sender’spayoffs

























































Figure 7: Graph of projA×Q E +(q) — commonly known as the Sender’s modiﬁed payoffs
true in any cell in our partition, and there are only ﬁnitely many regions according to our
partitions all of which are ﬁnitely generated, so that projA×Q grE is ﬁnitely generated. It is
now a simple matter to add the additional payoffs at the boundaries of the simplex ∆k−1 to
show that projA×Q grE + is also ﬁnitely generated.
We shall now come to a statement of the ﬁniteness condition which is essential to our
making progress. Before we state the condition, we shall make some deﬁnitions. Recall that
if {v0,...,vq} is an afﬁne independent subset of some Euclidean space, then it spans the
q-simplex s := [v0,...,vq] = co({v0,...,vq}). The vertex set of s is denoted by Vert(s) :=
{v0,...,vq}. Ifsisaq-simplexandt isanr-simplex, thenweshallcalls×t aq×r-bi-simplex
and we shall denote its vertex set by Vert(s × t) := Vert(s) × Vert(t). If σ is a bi-simplex,
then a face of σ is a bi-simplex σ′ with Vert(σ′) ⊂ Vert(σ).16
5.12Deﬁnition. A ﬁnite bi-simplicial complex K is a ﬁnite collection of bi-simplices in some
product of Euclidean spaces such that:
16These deﬁnitions are the obvious analogues of standard notions in algebraic topology which can be
found, for instance, in [9].5 Long Conversations 21
(i) if σ ∈ K, then every face of σ also belongs to K;
(ii) if σ,τ ∈ K, then σ ∩ τ is either empty or a common face of σ and of τ.
We now introduce a ﬁniteness condition.
Condition F [Finiteness Condition]. Given a set W0, then for all A ∈ 2W0,
bi-co(A) = K, where K is a bi-simplicial complex.
If we let G0 be the ﬁnite set generating the modiﬁed graph of the payoffs, grE + then
W0 := projA G0 × projQ G0.
5.13Deﬁnition. ASender-ReceivergamesatisﬁesConditionF ifthegeneratingsetofthegraph
of the Sender’s payoffs, G0, is such that W0 = projA G0 × projQ G0 (as deﬁned above) satisﬁes
Condition F.
It should be mentioned that there is no example of a Sender-Receiver game that does not
satisfy Condition F. In the appendix, we shall relate Condition F to a purely geometric
condition on the bi-convex hulls of ﬁnite sets.
Theorem A below relies on the following lemma.
5.14Lemma. LetA ⊂ A×QbegeneratedbyaﬁnitesetA0 andsupposeW0 satisﬁesCondition
F. Then A∗ = A#.
Proof. This is a key lemma and we shall informally describe why one might expect it to
be true. For a formal proof, the reader can is referred to the Appendix. Analogous to the
convex case, in the bi-convex case we can deﬁne bi-convex functions. These are functions
deﬁned on a bi-convex domain that are convex on every a- and q-section of the domain.
Just as in the convex case, we can talk about the set of points that can be separated from
a given set via bi-convex functions. Indeed, this can be deﬁned as an inductive process
starting from a large enough set (so that things remain interesting). By Theorem 4.3 in [2]
(see Appendix A below), for a set A ⊂ A × Q, A# is the limit of an inductive process of
separation by bi-convex functions. Now, if we restrict ourselves to separation by bi-convex
functions that are continuous on A, then the resultant limit set deﬁned is A∗ (Theorem 4.7
in [2], also described in Appendix A).
At this point, it may be pertinent to point out the difﬁculties that arise. In the convex
case, results on separation stem from the separating hyperplane theorem which essentially
says that when considering separation properties, we may restrict attention to separation
by linear functionals. This is a global result, as linear functionals deﬁned on a convex set
can be extended to the entire space. Unfortunately, there is no such global analogue in the
bi-convex case. Instead, we obtain a global result by considering separation at a local level
(by piecewise bi-afﬁne functions) and performing this separation across the entire space.5 Long Conversations 22
More speciﬁcally, it turns out that for ﬁnitely generated sets, one can restrict attention
to separation from the ﬁnite generating set. We then show that by taking a large enough
ﬁnite set and considering its bi-convex hull, the process of separation (by both bi-convex
functions and bi-convex functions continuous on A) is equivalent to removing bi-extreme
points17 (points which are not non-trivial bi-convex combinations of other points) of the
bi-convexhullofthelargerﬁnite set. Theprocessendsinﬁnite timeasthereareonlyﬁnitely
many points to consider and our result follows immediately.
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem A. Let Γ be a ﬁnite Sender-Receiver game that satisﬁes Condition F.
Then the set of equilibria with unbounded conversations is the same as the set of
equilibria with unbounded conversations that end in ﬁnite time with probability
one.
In other words, the q0- section of G# is the same as the q0- section of G∗, where G =
projA×Q grE + is the graph of the Sender’s payoffs. In fact, we shall prove that G# = G∗.
Proof of Theorem A. From Lemma 5.11, we know that the modiﬁed graph of the Sender’s
payoffs is ﬁnitely generated. Therefore from Lemma 5.14, the set of equilibrium payoffs
from unbounded conversations is the same as the set of equilibrium payoffs from un-
bounded conversations that end in ﬁnite time with probability one.
Note that the proof of Lemma 5.14 is actually constructive, in that we provide an algo-
rithm to compute the set of equilibria. But this is merely a consequence of Condition F. In
other words, the set of equilibria can be decomposed into a bi-simplicial complex (as it is
the section of a bi-simplicial complex). We shall now look at an example which illustrates
what this set of equilibria might look like.
5.15Example. Consider once again the game introduced in Example 5.10. Below, in ﬁgure
8 is a picture of the section of the graph of the Receiver’s payoffs with a1 + a2 = 4. (The
coordinates in ﬁgure 8 represents the pair (a1,q), which automatically gives the value of a2
at that point to be 4 − a1.) It is easily seen from ﬁgure 7 that the graph of the Receiver’s
payoffs is bi-convex, which means that there can be no information transmitted with ﬁnite
conversations of any length. But the moment we consider inﬁnite conversations, we get
Pareto superior payoffs for both types of the Sender and the Receiver. For instance, there
is an equilibrium where the two types of the Sender get expected payoffs (2,2) and the
Receiver gets expected payoff 5.
17Given a convex set C, x ∈ C is an extreme point of C if x = λy1 + (1 − λ)y2 with λ ∈ (0,1) implies that













Figure 8: a1 + a2 = 4 section of graph of Receiver’s payoffs
6 (Trans)ﬁnite Conversations
Inthissectionweconsidersomeimportantquestionsthatarerelatedtothelengthofpoten-
tial conversations. In particular, we shall consider ﬁnite and transﬁnite conversations. We
shall ﬁrst provide deﬁnitions and results and then concludethe section with a discussion of
the results.
As in §4.2, we let G = projA×Q grE + be the graph of the Sender’s (modiﬁed) payoffs
and say that G is generated by G0. We ﬁrst consider ﬁnite canonical18 conversations. Let
 G b be the set of all bi-convex combinations of G and deﬁne Gn+1 :=  Gn b. It follows
from (a modiﬁcation of) Theorem B in [3] that the set of equilibrium payoffs (for the
Sender) from ﬁnite conversations that last n-periods is the q0- section of Gn. Then, the
set of equilibrium payoffs from all ﬁnite conversations is the q0- section of
 
n∈N Gn =:
bi-co(G0) = bi-co(G).19 We are now able to state our result on ﬁnite conversations.
6.1 Theorem. Let Γ be a Sender-Receiver game that satisﬁes Condition F. Then there exists
an N such that for all n > N, the q0- section of Gn is identical to the q0- section of GN.
In other words, the set of equilibria from ﬁnite conversations eventually stabilises if
we allow the players to talk for large but ﬁnite periods. This is a direct consequence of
Condition F as we demonstrate below.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. It will sufﬁce to prove that there exists an N so that GN = bi-co(G0).
We know from Lemma 5.11 that G is ﬁnitely generated by G0. By Condition F, it follows
that bi-co(G0) is a bi-simplicial complex. It is now immediate that there exists an N such
that bi-co(G0) = GN. Also, bi-co(bi-co(G0)) = bi-co(G0) (because bi-co(G0) is thesmallest
bi-convex set which contains G0) which demonstrates our claim.
18In fact, we shall only consider canonical conversations. We shall therefore drop the qualiﬁer “canonical”
in what follows.
19See the Appendix for a proof that for any set A0, bi-co(A0) :=
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We now come to conversations that are longer that ω. For concreteness, we consider
only conversations of length ω + ω. Let the set of equilibrium payoffs for the Sender from
conversations that are of length ω be denoted by the q0- section of G∗ and the set of equi-
librium payoffs from conversations of length ω + ω by the q0- section of (G∗)∗. At this
point, it may be useful to clarify the meaning of conversations of length ω + ω. Recall that
conversations of length ω mean that the players communicate till inﬁnity and the Receiver
thentakes an action. This makes the game treeofordertype ω + 1. But after a conversation
of length ω, the players may choose to have another round of conversation of length ω (or
less). This seems natural especially since we are assuming that the players cannot commit
to not talking any more and are free to do as they please. Thus, if a conversationof length ω
makes sense, thenso doesa conversationof length ω + ω. The question is, doesthis further
expand the set of equilibria? Well, not if the game satisﬁes Condition F.
6.2Theorem. LetΓ beaSender-ReceivergamethatsatisﬁesConditionF. Thentheq0-section
of G∗ is identical to the q0- section of (G∗)∗ which is the same as the q0- section of G#.
Proof. See the appendix.
Indeed, we can say even more.
6.3 Corollary. Let Γ be a Sender-Receiver game that satisﬁes Condition F. Then the set of
equilibria from conversations that are ﬁnite with probability 1 (the q0- section of G#) is the
same as the set of equilibria from conversations that are of order type nω for all n ∈ ω.
Proof. Same as the proofof theorem 6.2.
Once again, we see that Condition F is the central ingredient to our result. The rea-
son Condition F plays such a pivotal role has to do with the inhomogeneous nature of
bi-convexity. As is demonstrated in the Appendix, bi-convexity is very different from con-
vexity inthat anumber oftheoremsfromthe convexcase donotcarryovertothebi-convex
case. A good number of these theorems have to do with the structure of convex sets which
implies that for a given set A, the topological propertiesof bi-co(A), A# and A∗ can be very
strange. Recall that for a set A0, we denoted the set of bi-convex combinations of A by  A0 b
and deﬁned An+1 :=  An b. Now, there exist sets such that for all n ∈ N,  An b    An+1 b.
In other words, the bi-convex hull of such a set can only be obtained after an inﬁnitary
process. Thus, the notion of bi-convexity is not ﬁnitistic (while convexity is). Therefore, by
imposing Condition F, we automatically exit the realm of the inﬁnite where things can be
very strange and enter a realm where things are well behaved.
But that is not all. Aumann and Hart (§5 of [2]) give an example of a set A such that
A#   A∗. The set A in their example is piecewise algebraic, but it does not come from a7 Conclusion 25
Sender-Receiver game (as it is not ﬁnitely generated). Also, while A is piecewise algebraic,
neither A# nor A∗ are. Moreover, they also give an example of a set A where A∗   (A∗)∗
which shows the relevance of Theorem 6.2.
But what about the converse? Just how strong is our Condition F? The problemwe face
is that we do not have an example of a game that does not satisfy Condition F. Essentially,
what we are doing in the proof of Lemma 5.14 is that we take the ﬁnitely many points and
remove the ones that are bi-extreme with respect to some bi-convex set. As everything
satisﬁes Condition F, we are ﬁne. But if Condition F fails, then our proof does not go
through. But what is worse, it is then also possible that bi-co(G) does not stabilise after
some large but ﬁnite number of rounds. Also, we would lose the niceness of the set of
equilibrium payoffs.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider some questions regarding the set of equilibria in Sender-Receiver
games with extended conversations. The question of whether unbounded conversations
are the same as conversations that are ﬁnite with probability 1 is important from the point
of view of applications. After all, we are trying to understand the advantages of not plac-
ing deadlines on conversations when there may mutually beneﬁcial exchanges (ﬁguratively
speaking) that are possible. We ﬁnd a sufﬁcient condition for the above question to have
an afﬁrmative answer. Surprisingly enough, the sufﬁcient condition is closely related to the
questions of whether the equilibria from ﬁnite talk eventually stabilise and whether trans-
ﬁnite talk may be useful and also ensures that the set of equilibria can be built up from
geometric objects of increasing dimension in ﬁnitely many steps.
The importance of the set of equilibria being simple (in particular, a bi-simplicial com-
plex) cannot be overstated. When a game satisﬁes Condition F, we have shown that the set
of equilibria in unbounded talk is actually semi-algebraic.20 To understand the signiﬁcance
of this, consider ﬁrst a set A := {x ∈ Rn : f1(x) > 0,...,fℓ(x) > 0,g1(x) =     =
gm(x) = 0} where the fi’s and gi’s are “nice” functions, say polynomials. Upon performing
elementary logical, algebraic and topological operations like taking unions, convexifying,
projecting etc., we get new sets. If we keep performing these operations, two scenarios
emerge. In the ﬁrst, the process stabilises after some number of steps and in the second,
ever more complicated sets arise (e.g. the Cantor sets and Borel sets of arbitrarily high
complexity). Semi-algebraic sets are of the ﬁrst kind. In particular, every semi-algebraic set
20A semi-algebraic set is deﬁned by ﬁnitely many polynomial inequalities (with the polynomials being over
any ﬁeld). When the ﬁeldin questionisreal, closed, these setsare some ofthe simplest setsthat onecan deﬁne
and permit quantiﬁer elimination. For a further description of these ideas, the reader is referred to [12].7 Conclusion 26
has a simplicial decomposition. The Aumann-Hart notions of bi-co(A), A# and A∗ are of
the second kind. They are extremely complicated objects in general and even taking sec-
tions of these objects can only be done in principle. In other words, there may not be a
decision procedureto determine if a point lies in the set.
Nevertheless, equilibria in ﬁnite games are semi-algebraic, i.e. belong to the ﬁrst sce-
nario described above. Moreover, all the popular reﬁnements in use also give rise to semi-
algebraic sets. This includes all the reﬁnements that are deﬁned pointwise (e.g. sequential
equilibrium and perfect equilibrium - see Blume and Zame [8]) and stable equilibria which
are set-valued as deﬁned by Mertens in [19]. This is an attractive and desirable propertyas
semi-algebraic sets are deﬁnable in a very precise sense (see [12]) and this means that not
only can the game theorist compute the set of equilibria, but the players can too. We would
like equilibria of unbounded conversations to have the same property, especially since we
are restricting attention to ﬁnite games.
Our inability to say more about the when Condition F holds can be traced back to the
peculiar geometry of bi-convex sets and the fact that the bi-convex hull of a set has an
internal representation which is necessarily the limit of a countable process. Nevertheless,
we have made some progress with regards to the effective length of conversations needed
to achieve certain equilibrium outcomes. It has been an open question, at least since the
publication of [2], whether there exists a game where communication which is unbounded
butﬁnite withprobabilityoneandcommunicationwhichisunboundedhasdifferentsetsof
equilibria. We take asmall step towardsanswering that questionby identifying exactly what
must happen in orderthat the two sets be different. Moreover,we present the dichotomous
nature of sets of equilibria from ﬁnite and transﬁnite talk. We can either expect all of them
to behave nicely or it is probably the case that none of them will.
From a purely mathematical point of view, another important question arises (which is
closely related to Condition F). Namely, are their algebraic conditions on a ﬁnite (or semi-
algebraic) set which will ensure that the bi-convex hull of the set will be achieved in ﬁnitely
many iterations? This characterisation may not be possible in general, but we hope that the
extra structure that the graph of Sender-Receiver games possess will be of some use.
The present paper also represents a departure from previous work in that it points out
the algebraic difﬁculties that must be overcome to say more about the problem at hand. It
shouldbe notedthatthisisnotatopologicalproblemasbi-convexityisnotpreservedunder
continuous transformations (which means that we cannot bring to bear powerful methods
from algebraic topology). (It may be shown that the any group of transformations which
preserves bi-convexity and the origin is a subgroup of GL(m,R) × GL(n,R).) But we are





the text above. It should be noted that many of the propositions below will seem obviously
true. While this may be so, we still provide proofs and give some examples of statements
that seem “obviously true” (because of the analogue in the convex case) but are not in the
bi-convex case. We then provide proofs of Lemma 5.14 and Theorem 6.2. We conclude
the appendix with an axiomatisation of the graph of payoffs of the silent game (grE) in
Sender-Receiver games, thereby removing our problem from the corsettes of game theory
and making it purely mathematical.
A.1 Bi-convexity and bi-martingales
Let us recall the deﬁnitions in Aumann and Hart [2]. Let X ,Y be compact convexsubsets
of ﬁnite dimensional Euclidean spaces. Let B ⊂ X × Y . Let Bx := {y ∈ Y : (x,y) ∈ B}
and By := {x ∈ X : (x,y) ∈ B}. B is bi-convex if for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , Bx and By are
convex sets. Let f : B → R. The function f is bi-convex if for all x ∈ X , f(x, ) is a convex
function on Bx and if for all y ∈ Y , f( ,y) is a convex function on By.
The space X × Y inherits the product topology relative to the Euclidean spaces they live
in. Let us denote this as T . Let us denote the relative topology of a set B ⊂ X × Y by
TB. Let us denote the bi-relative topology by TBR, where TBR consists of all sets of the form
{E ∩ U : U ∈ T } and E := aff (projX B) × aff (projY B). A point z = (x,y) ∈ B is
bi-relatively interior to B if z is interior in the topology TBR (not the topology relative to B).
A point z = (x,y) ∈ B is locally bi-simplicial at z if there exists a neighbourhood U of x in
X , a neighbourhood V of y, a collection of simplices s1,s2,...,sm in X and a collection of
simplices t1,t2,...,tn in Y such that (putting s =
 m
i=1 si and t =
 n
i=1 ti), s × t ⊂ B and
(U × V) ∩ B = (U × V) ∩ (s × t). We then have the following proposition.
A.1 Proposition (Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 in [2]). Let f be a bi-convex function on a bi-
convex set B, and let z ∈ B.
(i) If z is a bi-relatively interior point of B, then f is lower-semi-continuous at z.
(ii) If B is locally bi-simplicial at z, then f is upper-semi-continuous at z.
The following example also from [2] illustrates these ideas beautifully.
A.2 Example. Let X = Y = [0,1] and let B := {(t,t) : 0 < t < 1}. Then every point of
B is relatively interior but none is bi-relatively interior. Similarly, every point of B is locally
simplicial but none is locally bi-simplicial. Also, any function on B is bi-convex.A.1 Bi-convexity and bi-martingales 28
Let X and Y be compact, convex subsets of Euclidean spaces. Let (Ω,F,P) be a non-
atomic probability space. A sequence (zt)∞
0 := (xt,yt)∞
0 of X × Y -valued random vari-
ables is a bi-martingale if:
1. There exists a non-decreasing sequence (Ft)∞
0 of subﬁelds of F, such that (zt) is a
martingale with respect to (Ft).
2. For each t = 0,1,..., either xt = xt+1 or yt = yt+1 (a.s.).
3. z0 is constant (a.s.).
Let A be a measurable subset of X × Y . We will require the following deﬁnitions.
A.3 Deﬁnition. bi-co(A) is the smallest bi-convex set containing A.
A.4Deﬁnition. A# := {z ∈ X ×Y : ∃ bi-martingale (zt) with an a.s. ﬁnite stopping time
N such that zN ∈ A (a.s.) and z0 = z (a.s.)}.
A.5 Deﬁnition. A∗ := {z ∈ X × Y : ∃ bi-martingale (zt) converging to z∞ such that
z∞ ∈ A and z0 = z (a.s.)}.
Foragivenbi-convexsetBthatcontainsA, theset nsA(B)consistsofallpointsofBthatcan-
not be separated fromA by any bi-convex function, i.e. for all z ∈ nsA(B) and any bounded,
bi-convex function f : B → R, f(z) 6 supf(A).
We will now deﬁne a process of separation. Let B0 := X × Y . Deﬁne inductively, Bα+1 =
nsA(Bα) for every successor ordinal α and Bα =
 
β<α Bβ for every limit ordinal α. This
deﬁnes a non-increasing sequence21 of sets (Bα) with limit C := Bγ for some ordinal γ. By
Zorn’s Lemma, it follows that C is well deﬁned. We then have the following proposition.
A.6 Theorem (4.3 in [2]). The limit set C satisﬁes C = nsA(C) and is the largest
such set. Also, C = A#.
If we take the set A to be closed (as is the case in all of our applications), we can deﬁne a
similar notion of separation in terms of bi-convex functions which are continuous at every
point of the set A, which we shall denote by nsc(B) (≡ nscA(B)) and a similar inductive
process which will give us another limit set D. This gives us
21A sequence is a function whose domain is an ordinal (cf. §2.4 of [18]).A.1 Bi-convexity and bi-martingales 29
A.7Theorem(4.7in[2]). The limitset D satisﬁesD = nscA(D) and is the largest
such set. Also, D = A∗.
Note that for each bi-convex set B that contains a set A, both nsA(B) and nscA(B) are bi-
convexsets. Thisisbecauseifz ∈ nsA(B)(say)thenifmust bethecasethatforallf : B → R
biconvex, f(z) 6 supf(A). Now suppose z,z′ ∈ nsA(B), then for any z′′ := tz + (1 − t)z′
a bi-convex combination, we have f(z′′) 6 max{f(z),f(z′)} 6 supf(A) which implies that
z′′ ∈ nsA(B), that is nsA(B) is bi-convex. A similar argument shows that nscA(B) is also
bi-convex. To demonstrate these ideas, let us reconsider example 5.6 above.
A.8 Example. Let A := {a1 = (2/3,0),a2 = (0,1/3),a3 = (1/3,1),a4 = (1,2/3)} and
X = Y = [0,1]. We claim that A# = A∗ = bi-co({ai,wi}i=1), as illustrated in ﬁgure
9 below. By Lemma A.11 below, supf({ai,wi}4
i=1) > supf(bi-co({ai,wi}4
i=1)). We can
therefore restrict attention to the wi’s. Now suppose we could separate one of the points
wi with some bi-convex function f. Let us assume that w1 is such that f(w1) > f(wj) for
j = 2,3,4. Now note that if g is a bi-convex function then f := max{g − supg(A),0} is
also bi-convex and takes value 0 an A. We can therefore restrict attention to separation by
such functions. Thus, f(w1) 6
1
2 [f(a1) + f(w2)] which is impossible as f(a1) = 0. Thus, we
cannot separate any ofthe points, (wi)4
1. That this indeed is A∗ is now easy to see. (Consider
separation by bi-convex functions of the form h(x,y) := max{x − x0,0}max{y − y0,0}.)
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Figure 9: A = {ai}4
1 = bi-co(A)   A∗
the graph of the modiﬁed payoffs of the silent
game, bi-co(A)isthesetofpayoffsthatonecan
achieve with ﬁnite conversations, A# is the set
of payoffs achievable with unbounded conver-
sations that are ﬁnite withprobability 1 and A∗
isthesetofpayoffsachievablewithunbounded
conversations. It follows from the deﬁnitions
that A ⊂ bi-co(A) ⊂ A# ⊂ A∗.
We will begin with some deﬁnitions of our own.
A.9 Deﬁnition. A set A ⊂ X × Y is generated by A0 ⊂ A if for all z ∈ A, there exist
α1,...,αn (with αi > 0 and
 
i αi = 1) and a1,...,an ∈ A0 such that z =
 n
1 αiai is a
bi-convex combination.22
A.10 Deﬁnition. A set A is ﬁnitely generated if there exists a ﬁnite set A0 which generates it.
22Aconvexcombination(x,y) =
 
i αi(xi,yi)(withαi > 0and
 
i αi = 1)will becalledbi-convex ifeither
x1 =     = xn = x or y1 =     = yn = y.A.1 Bi-convexity and bi-martingales 30
We shall denote the set of all bi-convex combinations ofa set A0 ⊂ X ×Y by  A0 b. Thus,
if we let A1 :=  A0 b and Ai+1 :=  Ai b =  A0 i+1
b , the bi-convex hull of A0 is given by
bi-co(A0) =
 
i Ai. To see that this characterisation is correct, let B =
 
i Ai and consider
two points z1,z2 ∈ B. Let z1 ∈ Am and z2 ∈ An and suppose m < n. This implies that
z1 ∈ An and every bi-convex combination of z1 and z2 is in An+1, i.e. in B. Thus, B is a
bi-convex set and the result is immediate. We now note the following remark.
A.11 Lemma. Let A ⊂ X × Y and let B = bi-co(A). Then for any bi-convex function
f : B → R, supf(B) = supf(A).
Proof. Let us take A0 := A and as above, let A1 :=  A0 b and Ai+1 :=  Ai b. For any a ∈ A1,
wecan writea =
 
αiai, a bi-convexcombinationwhereai ∈ A0. This implies supf(A0) >
 
αif(ai) > f (
 
αiai) = f(a), where the second-to-last inequality is because f is bi-
convex. Similarly, supf(Ai) > supf(Ai+1). Therefore, we get supf(A0) > supf(A1) >
    > supf(Ai) >    . But (Ai) is an increasing sequence of sets with limit B = bi-co(A0),
which implies that supf(A0) > supf(B).
The Lemma above is equivalent to the observation that for any set A with B = bi-co(A),
B = nsA(B). In otherwords,B ⊂ A#, afact which followsimmediately fromthe deﬁnitions
of B and A#. As mentioned above, we shall be concentrating on the generators of sets. The
lemma below says that this is without loss of generality.
A.12 Lemma. Let A be generated by A0. Then




Proof. (i) By deﬁnition, bi-co(A0) ⊂ bi-co(A). If the inclusion is strict, then there exists a
bi-convex set B′ such that A0 ⊂ B′ and A   B′. But this is impossible as every point in A is
a bi-convex combination of points in A0.
(ii) Suppose A
#
0   A#, then there exists z ∈ A# and a bi-convex function f : A# → R
such that f(z) > supf(A0). (If such a point and corresponding function did not exist, then
A# = nsA0(A#) which, by Theorem A.6, contradicts A
#
0 ’s maximality.)
Now, for any a ∈ A, we know that a =
 
αiai, a bi-convex combination with ai ∈ A0.
But f(z) > supf(A0) >
 
αif(ai) > f (
 
αiai) = f(a), where the second-last inequality is
because f is bi-convex. In other words, f(z) > supf(A) which contradicts A# = nsA(A#)
which implies that such a z cannot exist. Thus, A# \ A
#
0 = ∅, i.e. A# = A
#
0 .
Before introducing an important concept regarding the geometry of bi-convex sets, we re-
call some analogous ideas in the convex case.A.1 Bi-convexity and bi-martingales 31
A.13 Deﬁnition. An extremepoint of a convex set S in a vector space E is a point x ∈ S such
that for all y1,y2 ∈ S such that x = ty1 + (1 − t)y2 with 0 < t < 1 implies y1 = y2.
A.14 Lemma. Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset of E, a vector space (over the
reals). Then there exists an extreme point of S.
Of course, we are assuming that E∗ is a vector space of linear maps of E into R (not
necessarily the dual of E) and that E∗ separates E, that is, if x ∈ E, then there exists λ ∈ E∗
such that λ(x)  = 0. Also, E∗ is endowed with the weak topology, i.e. the coarsest topology
which makes all the λ ∈ E∗ continuous. The other important property of convex sets is
that they can be expressed as the convex hulls of their extreme points. This is the celebrated
Krein-Milman theorem. The proofs of both Lemma A.14 and the Krein–Milman Theorem
can be found in the Appendix to Chapter IV in [16].
Krein–Milman Theorem. Let K be a convex, compact set in a vector space E.
Let S be the set of extreme points of K. Then K is the smallest closed convex set
containing all the elements of S.
Bi-convex sets also have points analogous to extreme points in the convex case. These are
what we shall call bi-extreme points, deﬁned below.
A.15 Deﬁnition. Let B ⊂ X × Y be a bi-convex set. A point z ∈ B is a bi-extremepoint of
B if for all z1,z2 such that z = tz1 + (1 − t)z2 (with 0 < t < 1) is a bi-convex combination
implies z1 = z2.
We shall provebelow that if B is the bi-convex hull of a compact set then it has a bi-extreme
point. We shall ﬁrst prove a useful lemma.
A.16 Lemma. Let S ∈ Rn be compact. Then
(i) co(S) has an extreme point; and
(ii) if x ∈ co(S) is an extreme point, then x ∈ S.
Proof. (i) Since S is compact, it followsthat co(S) is compact. By Lemma A.14, co(S) has an
extreme point.
(ii) Now co(S) = S ⊔ (co(S) \ S), a disjoint union. Let x ∈ co(S) be an extreme point of
co(S). If x ∈ co(S)\S, then x is a convexcombination ofpoints in S, contradicting its being
an extreme point. Therefore, if x is an extreme point of co(S), x ∈ S.
We now show that the bi-convex hull of compact set has a bi-extreme point.
A.17 Lemma. Let A ⊂ X × Y be compact. Then bi-co(A) has a bi-extreme point in A.A.2 A Lyrical Digression 32
Proof. Recall that X ⊂ Rm and Y ⊂ Rn. Let co(A) be the convex hull of A in Rm+n.
Then co(A) has an extreme point, by Lemma A.14 above and if z is an extreme point of
co(A), then z ∈ A. But this means that z cannot be written as a convex combination of
elements in bi-co(A) (which lies in co(A)) which implies that it cannot be written as a
bi-convex combination of elements in bi-co(A) (as every bi-convex combination is also a
convex combination). Thus, z is a bi-extreme point of bi-co(A).
A.2 A LyricalDigression
It may be pertinent to point out that the bi-convex case is sufﬁciently inhomogeneous, in
the sense that some fundamental theorems from convexity theory do not carry over to the
bi-convex case.23 We ﬁrst note that there is no analogue to the Krein–Milman Theorem
in the bi-convex case. An example will illustrate this fact. Let us reconsider the set ﬁrst
encountered in Example 5.6.
A.18 Example. Let A := {a1 = (2/3,0),a2 = (0,1/3),a3 = (1/3,1),a4 = (1,2/3)} and
X = Y = [0,1]. Consider the bi-convex hull of {ai,wi}4
i=1, as illustrated in ﬁgure 9.
Clearly, the (only) bi-extreme points of this bi-convex set are A = {ai}4
1. But bi-co(A) = A
and not the larger bi-convex set.
Asasecondexample,considerthefact thatapolyhedral24 convexsetisﬁnitelygenerated,
i.e. is the convex hull of ﬁnitely many points (cf. Theorem 19.1 in [22]). We may call a set
semi-bi-linear if it is deﬁned by ﬁnitely many bi-linear functions.25 Such a bi-convex set
need not be ﬁnitely generated as demonstrated in the example below.
A.19 Example. Deﬁne A := {(x,y) ∈ R2
+ : xy > 1, (x − 4)(y − 4) > 1, x 6 4 and y 6
4}. It is easy to see that A is bi-convex and both the functions f(x,y) := xy and g(x,y) :=
(x − 4)(y − 4) are bi-afﬁne. But A is not ﬁnitely generated. Indeed, its boundary has
curvature, which is not the case for a polyhedral set.
23Carath´ eodory’s Theorem also does not hold, as is demonstrated in [2].
24A polyhedral convex set (or equivalently, a semi-linear convex set), is deﬁned by ﬁnitely many linear
(weak) inequalities.
25A bi-linear function, also known as a bi-afﬁne function is a function f : B → R (where B ⊂ X × Y is
bi-convex) such that f(x, ) is an afﬁne function on Bx and f( ,y) is an afﬁne function on By, where Bx and By
are x- and y-sections of B.A.3 Proof of Lemma 5.14 33
A.3 ProofofLemma5.14
We now relate the discussion above to the ﬁnitely generated sets that are our primary con-
cern. We shall be interested in the following propertyof ﬁnite sets in product spaces.
ConditionH. For any set E ⊂ A0, there exists an n such that bi-co(E0) =  E0 n
b.
A.20 Lemma. Let A0 ⊂ X × Y be a ﬁnite set. Then A0 satisﬁes Condition F iff A0 satisﬁes
Condition H.
Proof. Straightforward.
We are interested in the expectations of bi-martingales with limits in a ﬁnite set A0. But
these sets of expectations can also be represented as the limits of a separation process (see
Theorems A.6 and A.7 above). The following lemma shows that if any separation takes
place (from a ﬁnite set) in the bi-convex hull of a ﬁnite set, then there is also separation of
a bi-extreme point. This is made precise below.
A.21 Lemma. Let A0 ⊂ X × Y be ﬁnite, A0 ⊂ W0 also ﬁnite and B = bi-co(W0) and
suppose f : B → R is a bi-convex function. Also suppose that W0 satisﬁes Condition H. Then
there exists z ∈ B with f(z) > supf(A0) iff there exists a bi-extreme point of B,   w ∈ W0 such
that f(  w) > supf(A0).
Proof. It follows from Lemma A.17 that B has a bi-extreme point and that any bi-extreme
point of B must lie in W0. Note that if f,g : B → R are bi-convex functions,26 then
max{f,g} is also a bi-convex function. This is because the maximum of two convex func-
tions is convex and f and g are convex on every section. Now suppose g is a bi-convex
function. Then f := max{g − maxg(A0),0} is a bi-convex function that separates every-
thing that g does (i.e. f(z) > 0 iff g(z) > 0) and takes the value 0 on all of A0. We can thus
restrict attention to f such that f(A0) = {0}.
As B = bi-co(W0), by Lemma A.11 it is the case that maxf(W0) = supf(B). This
implies that if there is z ∈ B with f(z) > 0, then there exists   w ∈ W0 such that f(  w) =
maxf(W0) > f(z) > 0. We shall now show that one can take such a   w to be a bi-extreme
point of B.
Let n be such that Wn =  W0 n
b = B = bi-co(W0) and suppose   w is not a bi-extreme
point. Then we can write   w as a (non-trivial) bi-convex combination of points that are
extreme in one of the (x- or y-) sections of   w. Let us replace   w in Wn−1 with these points.
Notethatallthesepointsmustalsotakethemaximumvalueunderf. Ifnoneofthesepoints
are bi-extreme in B, then proceed inductively and replace points in Wn−2 and so on. This
26We shall assume that the domain of a bi-convex function is a bi-convex set.A.3 Proof of Lemma 5.14 34
process stops in ﬁnite time with some bi-extreme point taking the maximum value under
f.
We shall recall a few more deﬁnitions (from [3]).
A.22 Deﬁnition.
1. A set D ⊂ X × Y × R is di-convex if for each x ∈ X and each y ∈ Y , the
respective x- and y-sections Dx := {(y,µ) ∈ Y × R : (x,y,µ) ∈ X × Y × R} and
Dy := {(x,µ) ∈ X × R : (x,y,µ) ∈ X × Y × R} are convex.
2. A convex combination (x,y,µ) =
 
i αi(xi,yi,µi) (with αi > 0 and
 
i αi = 1) will be
called di-convex if either x1 =     = xn = x or y1 =     = yn = y.
3. The di-convexhull of a set A is the smallest di-convex set containing A.
A.23 Lemma. Let W0 ⊂ X × Y be ﬁnite, B = bi-co(W0),   w ∈ W0 be a bi-extreme point
of B and suppose W0 satisﬁes Condition H. Then there exists a continuous, bi-convex function
g : B → R such that (i) g(  w) = 1, (ii) g(z) > 0 for all z ∈ bi-co(W0) \ bi-co(W0 \ {  w}) and
(iii) g(z) = 0 for all z ∈ bi-co(W0 \ {  w}).





1 if w =   w;
0 otherwise.
Let us also deﬁne D0,   D0 ⊂ X × Y × R by D0 = {(w,g(w)) : w ∈ W0} and   D0 =
{(w,g(w)) : w ∈ W0 \   w}. We shall denote the set of di-convex combinations of a set D
by  D d. This permits us to deﬁne inductively, Di+1 =  Di d and   Di+1 =    Di d. Note that
D0 and   D0 are compact (closed and bounded), which implies that for each i, Di and   Di are
also compact. Note also that for each i, Wi :=  W0 i
b = projX ×Y Di and   Wi :=     W0 i
b =
projX ×Y   Di. We shall demonstrate our claim by induction.
Induction hypothesis. For all z ∈   Wi, min{µ : (z,µ) ∈   Di} = 0, for all z ∈ Wi \   Wi,
min{µ : (z,µ) ∈   Di} > 0 and   w ∈ Wi \   Wi such that min{µ : (  w,µ) ∈   Di} = 1.
Now suppose z ∈   Wi+1. Then z =
 
αjzj a bi-convex combination where zj ∈   Wi for
each j. Then, min{µ : (z,µ) ∈   Di+1} = 0. Also, if z ∈ Wi+1 \   Wi+1, then z =
 
αjzj, a
bi-convex combination with some zk ∈ Wi \   Wi and the corresponding αk > 0. Therefore  
z,
 
αj min{µ : (zj,µ) ∈   Di}
 
∈ Di+1 \   Di+1 and min{µ : (z,µ) ∈ Di+1 \   Di+1} > 0. As
  w is a bi-extreme point, it cannot be written as a bi-convex combination of other point so
that min{µ : (  w,µ) ∈   Di+1} = 1.A.4 Proof of Theorem 6.2 35
By Condition H, we know that there is an n such that D =  D0 n
d is the di-convex hull
of D0. Let us now deﬁne
g(z) = min{µ ∈ X × Y × R : (z,µ) ∈ D}.
As each section of a di-convex set is convex, g(z) is convexon each section (cf. Theorem5.3
in [22]). Also, g(z) is as required, by construction.
We are now able to take our ﬁnal steps.
A.24 Lemma. Let A0 be ﬁnite, A0 ⊂ W0 ﬁnite and B = bi-co(W0) and suppose W0 satisﬁes
Condition H. Then B  = nsA0(B) implies B  = nscA0(B).
Proof. Suppose B  = nsA0(B). (As mentioned above, we can take all functions to take the
value 0 on A0.) Then there exists z ∈ B and f : B → R bi-convex such that f(z) > 0.
But by Lemma A.21, there also exists a bi-extreme point of B,   w ∈ W0 such that f(  w) > 0.
Moreover, there exists a continuous function g : B → R such that g(z) > 0 for all z ∈
bi-co(W0) \ bi-co(W0 \ {  w}).
A.25 Lemma (Lemma 5.14 in the text). Let A ⊂ X × Y be ﬁnitely generated and suppose
Condition H holds. Then A∗ = A#.
Proof. Let A0 generate A. Consider W0 ﬁnite such that A0 ⊂ W0 and note that A
#
0 = A#.
If B = bi-co(W0) then nsA0(B)  = B implies that nscA0(B)  = B. But in the proof of the
lemma above, we proved this by constructing a function that was continuous everywhere
on the domain. Thus, we actually proved (nsA0(B)  = B) → (nscA(B)  = B). But this
is not enough, as we have to show that the set A∗ (and consequently A#) is obtained in
this way. Let W0 : {(x,y) : x ∈ projX A0,y ∈ projY A0} and let Wi+1 := {w ∈
Wi : w is not a bi-extreme point of bi-co(Wi)}. This process ends in ﬁnite time at W and
A∗ = A# = bi-co(W).
A.4 ProofofTheorem6.2
A.26 Theorem (Theorem 6.2 in the text). Let Γ be a Sender-Receiver game that satisﬁes
Condition F. Then the q0- section of G∗ is identical to the q0- section of (G∗)∗ which is the
same as the q0- section of G#.
Proof. First, a simple observation. Let A ⊂ X ×Y be a ﬁnite set and let W := projX A ×
projY A. Then, for all C ⊂ W such that C ⊃ A, projX C × projY C = W. To see this,
ﬁrst note that for all c = (cx,cy) ∈ C, cx ∈ projX W and cy ∈ projY W. Thus, C ⊂ W.
Furthermore, W = projX A × projY A ⊂ projX C × projY C. Therefore, projX C ×
projY C = W.A.5 Graph of Payoﬀs in Sender-Receiver Games 36
Now, let G be the graph of the modiﬁed payoffs correspondenceof the Sender-Receiver
game, Γ and let G0 be the ﬁnite set that generates G. As above, let W0 := projA G0 ×
projQ G0. Since Γ satisﬁes Condition F, it is the case that G# = G∗. Also, from the proof
of lemma 5.14, we know that G∗ ⊂ bi-co(W0) and that G∗ is ﬁnitely generated by some
W′ ⊂ W0 withW′ ⊃ G0. Therefore,projA W′×projQ W′ = W0. But recall that W0 satisﬁes
Condition H, so that by the same argument as in the proof of lemma 5.14, it follows that
(G∗)# = (G∗)∗. From [2] (page 178), we know that (G#)# = G#. Therefore, we have
G∗ = G# = (G#)# = (G∗)# = (G∗)∗, where the ﬁrst and third equalities are lemma 5.14
and the second equality is from page 178 of [2].
A.5 GraphofPayoffsin Sender-ReceiverGames
We now present an axiomatisation of the fundamental unit of our analysis–the graph of
payoffs of the silent game. For simplicity, we shall only consider generic Sender-Receiver
games and we shall also avoid the additional notational burden of modifying the payoff
correspondence. (Taking care of both of these situations is straightforward.)
Let K be a simplicial complex so that |K| = ∆n−1 ⊂ Rn (where n is the number of
types of the sender and denote by Kn, the n-simplices in K. Let σ ∈ Kn be an n-simplex












A.27 Lemma. There exists a Sender-Receiver game Γ with graph of the payoff correspondence
of the silent game grE such that projA×Q E is generated by G0.
The idea is that each action of the Receiver is optimal for some beliefs over types. Since
the expected payoff from an action is linear in probabilities, this induces a simplicial de-
composition of ∆n−1. But over each simplex, the Sender’s payoff is constant.
Proof. For each σ ∈ Kn, assign the Receiver an action cσ with payoffs to (each type of) the
Sender a(cσ). Now to deﬁne the Receiver’s payoffs so that it induces the required simplicial
decomposition. Let f : Rn → R be given by f(x) :=  x−α 2 where α ∈ Rn is such that for
all v,w ∈ Vert(K), f(v)  = f(w). Such an α can always be chosen and is, in fact, generic (by
the Baire Category Theorem). Note that f is convex which means that f restricted to ∆n−1
is also convex. Now let F := {(v,f(v)) : v ∈ Vert(K)} and let
g := min{µ : (x,µ) ∈ co(F)}.A.5 Graph of Payoﬀs in Sender-Receiver Games 37
It follows from Theorem 5.3 in [22] that g is a convex function on ∆n−1. Moreover, it
is polyhedral and for all v ∈ Vert(K), f(v) = g(v). Also, every n-simplex in K is the
projectionof some lowerface of co(F), which ensures that g induces the requiredsimplicial
decomposition. For each n-simplex σ, g|σ is a linear function which can be extend to the
entire ambient space and denote the resulting linear function by βcσ. Let ei be the vertex in
∆n−1 which assigns probability 1 to type i of the Sender.
We now assign the Receiver the payoff βcσ(ei) when the Receiver takes the action cσ and
the type of the Sender is i. This gives us all the components of the game Γ.REFERENCES 38
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